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CAUGHT IN THE ECONOMIC CROSSHAIRS:
SECONDARY SANCTIONS, BLOCKING
REGULATIONS, AND THE AMERICAN
SANCTIONS REGIME
Daniel Meagher*
Economic sanctions have a long tradition of use in American foreign
policy. There are many benefits to using economic sanctions, particularly
when policymakers employ them as alternatives to military action.
Secondary sanctions developed as a relatively new tool intended to extend
the reach and potency of economic sanctions. They function in much the
same manner as traditional, or primary, sanctions. However, they target
individuals and entities who conduct prohibited business with the targets of
primary economic sanctions. Secondary sanctions are often accompanied
by severe financial penalties and threats of exclusion from U.S. consumer
and financial markets.
Through secondary sanctions, the United States can ensure the rest of the
world complies with its foreign policy objectives even if they are not
necessarily shared by the rest of the world. The Office of Foreign Assets
Control, the agency that administers the American sanctions regime, has
shown little regard for America’s allies when punishing individuals or
entities for noncompliance with secondary sanctions.
In response to American secondary sanctions, Europe has enacted a series
of blocking regulations intended to punish any European individual or entity
that alters an intended course of action in order to comply with American
sanctions. These blocking regulations were intended to counteract American
influence on European companies operating in the American markets.
Ultimately, however, the conflicting regimes have left individuals and entities
in a precarious legal position where dual compliance is impossible.
Compounding the issue, the American sanctions regime is shrouded in a lack
of transparency, with little allowance to appeal decisions made by the
executive branch. This Note examines the various methods by which an
adversely affected party can challenge U.S. secondary sanctions. Finding
these available methods lacking in effectiveness, this Note argues that
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2017, University of St
Andrews. Thank you to Professor Martin S. Flaherty and the editors and staff of the Fordham
Law Review for their guidance and support. I also thank my friends and family, especially my
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several avenues for reform should be taken to mitigate a potential freezing
effect on international commerce, financing, and other international
relations.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the French energy giant, Total, signed an agreement to form a
partnership with an Iranian company, Petropars, and invest one billion dollars
in the development of oil and gas facilities in Iran.1 The companies made
this investment agreement despite concerns that the Donald Trump
administration would reimpose sanctions on Iran and companies doing
business with Iran.2 A year later, Total announced its decision to withdraw
from the same deal following the reimposition of American sanctions on
Iran.3 The sanctions not only targeted Iran and Iranian companies but also
covered any individuals or entities doing business with these primary
targets.4 As such, Total withdrew from its agreement with Petropars due to
the fear that it would be sanctioned and excluded from the U.S. market.5
President Donald Trump articulated this threat in a sweeping tweet: “Anyone
doing business with Iran will NOT be doing business with the United
States.”6 Total is one of many European companies withdrawing previous
investments and halting operations in Iran due to the threat of U.S. secondary
sanctions.7
This trend of multinational businesses halting investment in Iran
continues, despite the European Union’s (EU) attempts to hold together the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran
nuclear deal.8 The EU has, for example, imposed blocking regulations
prohibiting European companies from changing their courses of action solely
in order to comply with U.S. sanctions.9 The conflict between these two legal
regimes on either side of the Atlantic leaves affected individuals and entities
in a difficult position.10

1. See Stanley Reed, Total Signs Deal with Iran, Exposing It to Big Risks and Rewards,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/business/energyenvironment/iran-total-france-gas-energy.html [https://perma.cc/U2SW-AMMJ].
2. See id.
3. See Michael Selby-Green, French Oil Giant Total Pulls Out of $4.8 Billion Iran Deal
Under
US
Pressure,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Aug.
21,
2018,
6:23
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/total-pulls-out-of-48-billion-iranian-oil-project-under-uspressure-2018-8 [https://perma.cc/R3LU-T7GW].
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1026762818773757955 [https://perma.cc/5DH7WZ6E].
7. See Selby-Green, supra note 3.
8. See Casper Wuite, European Companies Driven Out of Iran, INTERPRETER (Oct. 19,
2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/european-companies-drivenout-iran [https://perma.cc/C6ZU-ZT8Z].
9. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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The United States has long utilized economic sanctions to achieve foreign
policy objectives without the use of military force.11 However, there has
been a notable increase in the use of sanctions over the last several
The
presidential administrations, particularly secondary sanctions.12
challenge presented by the increasing use of these sanctions and their
apparent conflict with European law is compounded by the lack of clarity
surrounding the U.S. sanctions regime and the limited ability of targeted
parties to challenge sanctions once issued.13 Under current law, a party
adversely affected by secondary sanctions faces hefty fines14 and has little
recourse to challenge them.15
This Note examines the limited extent to which parties adversely affected
by the application of secondary sanctions may dispute them and suggests
reforms to the sanctions system. Part I provides relevant background
regarding the historically broad U.S. sanctions regime and the increasingly
conflicting international response. Part I explores this conflict and the
resulting war of sanctions, in which multinational corporations face difficult
decisions. Part I also outlines the legal authority behind the U.S. sanctions
regime, which is integral to understanding how the regime may be
challenged. Part II outlines the current state of the law regarding the U.S.
sanctions regime and the tradition of judicial deference to the executive
branch in international affairs, including its use of economic sanctions. Part
III recommends increasing the transparency of the U.S. secondary sanctions
regime through legislative action, allowing for heightened judicial review, in
order to mitigate secondary sanctions’ adverse effects on international
commerce.
I. U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD
Part I provides background regarding the use of international economic
sanctions. Part I.A discusses the history and purpose of U.S. sanctions,
including secondary sanctions. Part I.B outlines the relevant statutory and
administrative authority behind the U.S. sanctions regime and analyzes the
practical effects of these authorities through a case study. Part I.C examines
Europe’s historical responses to the U.S. sanctions regime and the increasing
popularity of retaliatory sanctions within Europe.

11. See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (1987) (discussing the historical use of
economic sanctions by the United States and the dominance of sanctions as a tool in American
foreign policy).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. SAMANTHA SULTOON & JUSTINE WALKER, ATL. COUNCIL, SECONDARY SANCTIONS’
IMPLICATIONS AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP (2019), https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SecondarySanctions_Final.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/5J8S-FVLH].
14. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.B.

2020]

CAUGHT IN THE ECONOMIC CROSSHAIRS

1003

A. The Development of the U.S. Sanctions Regime
Part I.A.1 introduces how the use of sanctions has generally been
prioritized over the use of military force in American foreign policy. Part
I.A.2 specifically addresses the use of secondary sanctions and the mechanics
of their implementation.
1. Use in Diplomacy
The United States has historically maintained a broad sanctions regime.16
As early as the War of 1812, then secretary of the treasury, Albert Gallatin
administered sanctions against Great Britain for the harassment of American
sailors.17 In the throes of the Civil War, Congress enacted a law prohibiting
transactions with the Confederate States of America, providing for the
forfeiture of goods involved in any such transactions and structuring an
exemption licensing regime under rules administered by the Department of
the Treasury.18
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States began implementing
economic sanctions as a means of exerting diplomatic influence on the
international stage.19 American policymakers’ frequent use of economic
sanctions reflects a calculated choice to select sanctions from among a wide
variety of tools available to them. Part of this choice is a recognition that a
generally accepted norm within the post–World War international
community is avoiding the use of armed force in foreign affairs.20 This
normative limitation, coupled with the large investment of economic and
human resources necessary for use of force, makes economic sanctions a
more palatable alternative means to exert international influence. Economic
sanctions allow the administering country’s leader to appear both decisive
and effective in decision-making, while avoiding the death toll and
destruction inherent in the use of force.21 Economic sanctions are thus more
normatively acceptable than use of armed force, yet more material than
diplomatic protests and entreaties.
The United States has often resorted to implementing unilateral sanctions
to achieve foreign policy objectives that lack international consensus.22 For
example, the unilateral decision of the United States to withdraw from the
JCPOA angered many European allies who saw the accompanying increase
in economic sanctions on Iran as counterproductive.23 The Trump
16. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1170.
17. See Off. of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1501
[https://perma.cc/5BQ5-YA4D] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
18. See id.
19. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1164.
20. See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER: THE LEGALIST APPROACH
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 21 (1999).
21. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1163.
22. Gary Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 332, 335 (1998).
23. Ian Talley et al., New U.S. Sanctions on Iran Set Back French Mediation Efforts,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-iranian-oil-

1004

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

administration has overseen the most aggressive expansion of economic
sanctions in modern U.S. history.24 The increased use of economic sanctions
corresponded with the administration’s policy goals of strong-arming both
North Korea and Iran into abandoning nuclear programs, compelling
Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro to cede power, and responding to allegations of
Russian interference in American elections.25 The Trump administration’s
increased use of economic sanctions is consistent with the overall trend of
increasing sanction use in recent American history.26
2. Secondary Sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control
Economic sanctions have been defined as “the deliberate, governmentinspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial
relations.”27 Sanctions typically include a wide swath of economic measures,
including: trade embargoes; restrictions on exports from or imports to the
American market; cessation of aid to foreign countries, loans, and foreign
direct investment; and control (i.e., freezing) of foreign assets and economic
transactions that involve American citizens or businesses.28 It would be an
oversimplification to analyze the sanctions regime en masse, as it can be
bifurcated into primary and secondary sanctions.
Primary sanctions prohibit companies and individuals in the sanctioning
country from engaging with their counterparts in the sanctioned country.29
These primary sanctions apply to persons, transactions, and goods over
which the sanctioning country can assert its jurisdiction. For example, in the
case of the United States, primary sanctions apply to American nationals,
American business entities, and any transactions occurring within U.S.
territory.
More controversially, the United States also employs secondary
sanctions.30 A secondary sanction is
any form of economic restriction imposed by a sanctioning or sending state
(e.g., the United States) that is intended to deter a third-party country or its

shipping-network-allegedly-controlled-by-quds-force-11567612927
[https://perma.cc/
K5LY-EQCT].
24. Ian Talley, Top U.S. Sanctions Chief to Leave Trump Administration for Private
Sector, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-u-s-sanctionschief-to-leave-trump-administration-for-private-sector-11570025888
[https://perma.cc/
D8AL-KP5C].
25. Id.
26. ELLIE GERANMAYEH & MANUEL L. RAPNOUIL, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.,
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF SECONDARY SANCTIONS (2019), https://ecfr.eu/wpcontent/uploads/4_Meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3W28-9DCH].
27. 1 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLICY 2 (2d ed. 1990).
28. DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-949F, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 1, 2 (1998).
29. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905,
926 (2009)
30. See SULTOON & WALKER, supra note 13.
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citizens and companies (e.g., France, the French people and French
companies) from transacting with a sanctions target (e.g., a rogue regime,
its high government officials, or a non-state terrorist entity).31

The need for secondary sanctions presupposes that the home country of these
third parties is neutral with regard to the target of the primary sanctions.32
The controversial characteristic of these secondary sanctions is their
extraterritoriality—they apply to foreign persons or entities over which the
U.S. Treasury Department traditionally would not have jurisdiction.33 Thus,
secondary sanctions differ from primary sanctions in that they are not
directed at the primary target but rather directed at the neutral third party.
“The imposition of secondary sanctions presupposes that the affected thirdparty country is a neutral or an ally of the target state—that the third-party
country has not itself instituted comparable sanctions to prohibit its own
citizens and companies from doing business with the target regime.”34
These secondary sanctions threaten to cut off foreign persons or entities
from accessing the U.S. consumer and financial markets if they trade or
otherwise transact with an entity or state subject to primary sanctions.35 The
use of these secondary sanctions is premised on the long-standing belief
among American policymakers that, because the United States is one of the
central figures of the global economy, any threat of restricting access to the
American consumer and finance markets amplifies sanctions’ effects beyond
the territorial limits inherent to primary sanctions.36 Thus, secondary
sanctions are able to achieve extraterritorial effect without necessarily
requiring the aggressive overuse of primary sanctions.
Since the Korean War, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has
headed the U.S. sanctions regime from within the Department of the
Treasury.37 OFAC’s primary mandate is to administer and enforce the
entirety of the broad U.S. sanctions regime.38 As an administrative agency,
OFAC exercises its mandate pursuant to various statutory delegations, most
importantly, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act39 (IEEPA).
However, as an agency within the Treasury Department under the executive
branch, OFAC has traditionally been afforded wide discretion by Congress

31. Meyer, supra note 29, at 926 (2009).
32. Id.
33. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
34. Meyer, supra note 29, at 926.
35. See id.
36. See Rachel Barnes, United States Sanctions: Delisting Applications, Judicial Review
and Secret Evidence, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 197–98
(Matthew Happold & Paul Eden eds., 2016).
37. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 17.
38. Jill M. Troxel, Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations: Making Attorneys
Choose Between Compliance and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 24 REV. LITIG. 637, 639
(2005).
39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708.
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and the courts, which recognize that international affairs are firmly within
the province of the executive.40
While OFAC publicly holds itself out as primarily targeting sanctioned
countries and terrorists,41 the agency also plays a key role in enforcing
secondary sanctions that adversely impact allied and nonenemy entities
outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Under the auspices of enforcing secondary
sanctions, OFAC effectively employs a range of other measures to influence
actions by non-U.S. nationals in non-U.S. territory.42 These measures range
from inclusion on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
list (“the SDN List”), resulting in a freezing of assets and restriction of
physical and monetary movement, to prohibitions on obtaining financing
provided by U.S. financial institutions.43
There is a very real fear among European commentators that, as secondary
sanctions continue to operate effectively under a cloudy legal framework, the
United States will further expand their use.44 OFAC is able to target an
increasing number of European corporations by restricting European free
choice in access to global markets.45 Essentially, secondary sanctions bring
European companies and firms squarely under the authority of OFAC.
In large part, secondary sanctions achieve this thanks to the critical role
that the United States plays in global commerce. American banks and the
U.S. dollar are enjoying unprecedented dominance in global capital markets
and financial transactions.46 Due to the international community’s
dependence on American banks and the U.S. dollar, the threat of OFAC
sanctioning—such as inclusion on the SDN List—has ripple effects, resulting
in many international business entities overcomplying with existing
sanctions regimes.47 This has resulted in capital flowing less freely across
borders and a major reputational hit to the EU concerning its autonomy and

40. James C. McMillin, M. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and U.S. Trade, 14 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J., 867, 867 (1990) (articulating the long-held belief that “[l]ike war, however,
economic sanctions are the province of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government: the judiciary, playing the supportive role, declares executive acts either
constitutionally permissible or statutorily authorized”).
41. See Off. of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 17.
42. See generally JOHN J. FORRER, ATL. COUNCIL, SECONDARY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
EFFECTIVE POLICY OR RISKY BUSINESS 3 (2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Secondary_Sanctions_WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TWV73NZ].
43. See Matthew Townsend et al., Iran Sanctions and the EU Blocking Regulation:
Navigating Legal Conflict, LEGAL & REGUL. RISK NOTE, Oct. 2018, at 6, 7,
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/legal-and-regulatory-risks-forthe-finance-sector [https://perma.cc/BVB6-5MJY].
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Liz Hoffman & Telis Demos, How US Banks Took Over the World, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 4, 2019, 5:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-u-s-banks-took-over-the-world11567589403 [https://perma.cc/N9EB-AR73].
47. See Townsend et al., supra note 43.
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international influence.48 European business entities are complying with
American foreign policy over the policies of their own nations.49
B. The Legal Authority Behind U.S. Sanctions
An amalgamation of legal authorities makes the broad U.S. sanctions
regime, maintained and enforced by OFAC, possible. Part I.B.1 presents the
National Emergencies Act50 (NEA) and Part I.B.2 discusses IEEPA. Part
I.B.3 analyzes the importance of executive orders to OFAC’s authority.
Finally, Part I.B.4 examines how the above three authorities mix in practice
and result in a particular OFAC sanctions program.
1. The NEA
The NEA was enacted a year before IEEPA, in an effort by Congress to
curtail many of the foreign relations powers it believed had been usurped by
the executive.51 The NEA terminated all ongoing so-called “emergencies”
in 1978—except those making use of section 5(b) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act52 (TWEA)53—and placed new curtailments on how the executive
could declare an emergency in the future and the duration of such a declared
state of emergency (e.g., the requirement that the president immediately
notify Congress of the national emergency declaration).54 Further, in
enacting the NEA, Congress required a biannual review whereby “each
House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a concurrent [joint]
resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.”55 The
NEA also authorized Congress to terminate the executive’s declared national
emergency through a concurrent resolution.56
The NEA has been criticized for its lack of teeth.57 For example, while
the NEA was intended to provide for congressional review of national
emergencies declared by the president (and the associated powers granted to
48. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
49. See id.
50. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 10, 16, and 50 U.S.C.).
51. See generally S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT’L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY
POWERS, 93RD CONG., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES
(Comm. Print 1974) (including a study by Harold C. Relyea).
52. Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 4305(b))
53. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
54. See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 10–11 (2020).
55. 50 U.S.C. § 1601.
56. See id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that legislative
vetoes of the executive are unconstitutional). In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Chadha, Congress amended the NEA on August 16, 1985, changing the requirement of a
“concurrent” resolution to one of “joint” resolution in an effort to make the so-called
“legislative veto” more democratically fortified. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405, 448 (1985) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
57. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 9.
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the president during emergencies) and allow for efficient termination of such
an “emergency,” those intentions were quickly nullified by a U.S. Supreme
Court case that found such a provision unconstitutional.58 Subsequent
amendments by Congress requiring a joint resolution of both chambers to
terminate a national emergency declared by the president made effective
congressional review more difficult to achieve.
2. IEEPA
Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977.59 IEEPA confers broad authority on the
president to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a
declaration of a national emergency.60 IEEPA is the foundation of the
modern American sanctions regime. IEEPA, like its progenitor, the TWEA,
represents a delegation of emergency power to the executive branch.61 Like
the TWEA, presidents have used IEEPA to: restrict a variety of international
transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict
exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct
investment in American companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the
United States.62 The targets of these regulations and restrictions, the
frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have broadened in scope
over the decades since enactment.63 Indeed, some scholars have argued—
with nodding approval from many members of Congress—that IEEPA is still
a source of unchecked and broad discretionary power for the president.64
The original ambit of the TWEA was exclusive to wartime, but it has
become normal for presidents to apply it long after a war concludes.65 In
fact, IEEPA was enacted out of an effort to curtail the seemingly limitless
use of the TWEA by the president to exert control over international financial
and trading transactions—even during peacetime.66 Specifically, section
5(b) of the TWEA received much of the criticism because successive
presidents interpreted it to confer on them unlimited international economic
control powers, with full knowledge that once integrated into the American
financial system during wartime, these economic regulations proved very
58. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
60. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 42 (discussing the expansive authority granted to
the president).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1).
62. Id. § 1702.
63. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 18–19 (observing that as of July 1, 2020,
presidents had declared fifty-nine national emergencies invoking IEEPA, thirty-seven of
which are still ongoing and that the United States had been in a “state of emergency” for more
than forty years).
64. See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency
Law Regime, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 737 (2013); Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Counterterrorism,
the Constitution, and the Civil-Criminal Divide: Evaluating the Designation of U.S. Persons
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 95, 96–97
(2011).
65. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 6–9.
66. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 9 (1977).
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difficult to extricate postwar.67 A review of the legislative history behind
IEEPA reveals that Congress was concerned that executive power in both
domestic and international economic affairs had become too discretionary
without any congressional review.68 For example, Professor Harold Maier
testified before the House Committee on International Relations as to the
TWEA:
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in
the sense of existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive
approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive
interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the
section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President . . . .69

Acting on these concerns, Congress enacted IEEPA to curtail the
executive’s authority under the TWEA. Among other measures, IEEPA
conferred “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of
national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of
section 5(b) and subject to various procedural limitations, including those of
the National Emergencies Act.”70 Specifically, the House of Representatives
aimed to limit the scope of section 5(b) by redefining “emergency” so as to
disallow presidents to issue a state of emergency to last decades.71 The
measures included within IEEPA intended to curtail the president’s authority
in this area include notice requirements to Congress, along with reassessment
and reports to Congress according to a regular, consistent time line.72
Ultimately, IEEPA, along with its umbrella statute, the NEA, has proven
ineffective at curtailing presidential invocation of emergency economic

67. See Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C.
§ 4305(b)).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 7.
69. Id. at 9 (quoting Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions:
Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y & Trade of
the H. Comm. on Int’l Rels., 95th Cong. 30 (1977) (statement of Harold G. Maier, Professor,
Vanderbilt University School of Law)).
70. Id. at 2.
71. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 6–9. The House Committee on International
Relations provided its interpretation of an emergency in its “new approach” to the president’s
international emergency economic powers:
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities and their availability at the President’s
discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be
subject to various substantive restrictions. The main one stems from a recognition
that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with
normal, ongoing problems. A national emergency should be declared and
emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances
which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose. The emergency should
be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and
not continued in effect for use in other circumstances. A state of national emergency
should not be a normal state of affairs.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 11.
72. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 10. When declaring a national emergency, the
NEA requires that the president “immediately” transmit a proclamation declaring the
emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register. The president must also specify
the provisions of law that the president intends to use. 50 U.S.C. § 1631.
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powers. Since congressional debate and the subsequent enactment of IEEPA,
presidents regularly declare national emergencies with regard to international
economic sanctions and renew them for years or even decades.73 Limiting
IEEPA to transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit
IEEPA’s domestic application. However, globalization has eroded that
distinction, as most transactions today involve some type of foreign
interest.74 Many of the TWEA’s other shortcomings that IEEPA was
supposed to address—consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope
of power, and logical relationship to the emergency declared—are
shortcomings of IEEPA that scholars still criticize today.75
3. Ukraine/Russia Case Study
OFAC is an agency within the Department of the Treasury.76 As an
executive branch agency, OFAC manages the broad U.S. sanctions regime
largely at the behest of the president.77 Due to the large economic and social
impact that sanctions can have on the American public, however, the modern
American sanctions regime has its genesis in congressional action.78 This
mix of statutory delegation and executive mandate results in a unique blend
of authority for OFAC.
The Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program the Barack Obama
administration implemented in 2014 is an example of the amalgamated
authority under which OFAC administers sanctions programs. OFAC took
initial steps toward building such a sanctions regime at the behest of the
president.79 On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive
Order 13,660 (“EO 13,660”), which declared a national emergency to deal
with the threat posed by persons or organizations undermining the
democratic processes and institutions in the Ukraine.80 President Obama
subsequently issued three more executive orders broadening the scope of the
emergency previously declared in EO 13,660.81 These subsequent executive
73. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 42.
74. See generally IMF, Globalization: A Brief Overview, Issues Brief (May 2008),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/pdf/053008.pdf [https://perma.cc/43GF-CCGT]
(reporting that the value of trade (goods and services) as a percentage of world gross domestic
product increased from 42.1 percent in 1980 to 62.1 percent in 2007).
75. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J.
1385, 1392 (1989); Jason Luong, Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (2000).
76. See Off. of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 17.
77. See DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30384, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
LEGISLATION IN THE 106TH CONGRESS 2 (2000).
78. See id.
79. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEP’T OF TREASURY, UKRAINE/RUSSIARELATED SANCTIONS PROGRAM 3 (2016) (explaining the legally binding provisions, found in
Executive Orders 13,660, 13,661, 13,662, 13,685, applicable laws, and implementing
regulations in 31 C.F.R. pt. 589, governing the sanctions program, intended to be punitive to
Russia due to its involvement in the Ukraine).
80. See Exec. Order No. 13,660, 3 C.F.R. 226 (2015).
81. See Exec. Order No. 13,661, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2015); Exec. Order No. 13,662, 3 C.F.R.
233 (2015); Exec. Order No. 13,685, 3 C.F.R. 313 (2015).
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orders were responses to the worsening situation in the Ukraine, linked to the
actions and policies of the Russian Federation, including the allegedly illegal
annexation of the Crimea region.82
These executive orders authorized OFAC to impose sanctions against
persons believed to have been involved in any illegal activities with respect
to the Ukraine and its government, against persons involved with the Russian
Federation in official capacities, and against industries and businesses
operating in the Crimea region of the Ukraine. Specifically, Executive Order
13,685 (“EO 13,685”) placed a prohibition on the importing and exporting
of goods and services to or from the Crimea region, while also forbidding
new investment by any U.S. person or entity in the Crimea region.83 Each of
these executive orders was issued pursuant to the authority statutorily given
to the president by IEEPA and the NEA.
Essentially, this series of executive orders outlined the policy directives
OFAC was meant to achieve. In achieving these directives, OFAC issued a
set of regulations intended to implement the policy directives outlined in the
executive orders.84 Accompanying these regulations, the secretary of the
treasury issued determinations, akin to guidance documents, as to the scope
of the executive orders and their corresponding sanctions, administered by
OFAC.85
In the specific case of the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions, OFAC
structured a comprehensive sanctions program. The program prohibited
transactions in three broad categories.86 First, the so-called “blocking
sanctions” prohibited any transactions by U.S. persons or transactions in the
United States if they involved transferring, exporting, withdrawing, or
otherwise dealing in property or interests in property of an entity or
individual listed on the OFAC’s SDN List.87 Second, OFAC implemented
sectoral sanctions, which prohibited extensions of debt or financing for
entities operating in certain sectors of the Russian economy identified by the
secretary of the treasury.88 Third, any future investment in, trade with, or
provision of financing to entities by OFAC was prohibited.89
82. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 79.
83. Exec. Order No. 13,685, 3 C.F.R. 313. The president issued this executive order
pursuant to IEEPA and the NEA to further economically constrict both the Crimea region and
its Russian Federation associates as a means of showing disapproval of the allegedly illegal
annexation of the region by the Russian Federation.
84. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 589 (2020).
85. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 79 (explaining that “the Secretary
of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination that
section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13662 shall apply to the financial services and energy sectors of the
Russian Federation economy”). Through these determinations, OFAC is able to expand the
scope of a sanctions regime without the formal rulemaking or the informal notice-andcomment rulemaking processes outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally
Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”: General Policy Statements and Notice-andComment Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491 (2016).
86. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 79, at 4–5.
87. See id. at 5.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 3.
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Through this program, and specifically the future investment provision,
OFAC effectively ensured that there would be limited, if any, future U.S.
investment or trade within the Crimea region and with specifically designated
Russian nationals (both corporations and natural persons). For example, if a
European company with extensive sales in the American market had been in
negotiations with a Crimea-based counterpart, this sanctions regime was
intended to stop those negotiations or threaten exclusion from the American
market.90
C.

History of Europe’s Response

1. Genesis of EU Blocking Regulations
While the United States has historically maintained the broadest and most
comprehensive sanctions regime, the EU and its member states have often
implemented their own sanctions programs in coordination with those of the
United States. At times, however, the EU has been faced with U.S. sanctions
that do not match EU foreign policy or even those that go so far as to target
EU businesses and individuals.
In the 1990s, Congress imposed a series of secondary sanctions on Cuba,
Libya, and Iran with characteristically extraterritorial impact.91 Many of
those impacted were European companies.92 For example, Europe
understood the sanctions enacted against Cuba as
contain[ing] a number of provisions which have the intent and effect to
restrain the liberty of the [European Community] to export to Cuba or to
trade in Cuban origin goods, as well as to restrict the freedom of [European
Community] registered vessels and their cargo to transit through US
ports.93

In response, European governments lodged a complaint with the World
Trade Organization94 (WTO) and conducted comprehensive, multilateral
negotiations with the Bill Clinton administration to dissuade the United
States from heavy-handed secondary sanctioning of European businesses.95
The EU further responded with its own sanction-like apparatus: blocking
regulations. Originally introduced by the EU in 1996, the blocking
regulations prohibited European companies from complying with U.S.
secondary sanctions.96 Through the blocking regulations, coupled with

90. See id.
91. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
92. See id.
93. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—The Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996).
94. See id.
95. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
96. See Townsend et al., supra note 43, at 2 (defining blocking regulations).
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WTO action and multilateral negotiations, the EU was able to avoid any
adverse effects from the secondary sanctions.97
2. Changing of the Winds
The above section illustrated an example of the EU asserting its own
international influence in confronting secondary sanctions. However, that
proactive response was lacking at critical times during the development of
the U.S. sanctions regime.
a. Falling into Line with America
During the Obama administration, the United States took unprecedented
steps toward strengthening its secondary sanctions through its response to the
global financial crisis. The administration increased oversight and regulation
of global financial institutions who were willed to comply through the
importance of the American market.98 According to one senior banking
executive based in Europe: “When the United States began using its
secondary sanctions, it didn’t know if it would work. There was trial and
error involved. If, at that time, all of the European central banks resisted
these measures, it is uncertain if the U.S. could target them.”99 The United
States would “target” these companies by either politically challenging these
business entities100 or utilizing OFAC’s authority to include them on its SDN
List. Unfortunately for the EU, the various European central banks did not
respond aggressively, and the United States’s reliance on secondary
sanctions has only increased.101
While the United States found its footing regarding its utilization of
secondary sanctions on multinational companies, European countries backed
U.S. foreign policy against Iran. From 2010 to 2012, the EU and the United
States introduced severe sanctions on Iran’s energy sector. The severity was,
in large part, due to the multilateral nature of the sanctions102—prohibiting
Iranian oil from accessing the wealthy, gas-guzzling consumer markets of
97. See James Bennet, To Clear Air with Europe, U.S. Waives Some Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES (May 19, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/19/world/to-clear-air-with-europeus-waives-some-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/FU82-RWCW].
98. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
99. See id.
100. Fear of being targeted politically by the United States is a justified concern for
multinational businesses. Indeed, business entities’ operations can be significantly impacted
by public challenges from politicians. See Philip Bump, Did Donald Trump Tank Boeing’s
Stock Because He Was Mad About a News Article? WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/06/did-donald-trump-tankboeings-stock-because-he-was-mad-about-a-news-article
[https://perma.cc/8JKB-4UPR].
See generally Sam Thielman, Trump’s Tweet About Lockheed-Martin Cuts $4bn in Value as
Share Prices Fall, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/
dec/12/lockheed-martin-share-prices-donald-trump-tweet [https://perma.cc/BFU4-V9BV].
101. See generally William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus
Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 37
(1999) (examining and arguing for the increased use of unilateral sanctions).
102. See id. at 53–54.
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both Europe and the United States packed a powerful punch against Iran.103
There was no conflict at the time over these sanctions on Iran because the
respective foreign policies on either side of the Atlantic aligned.104 For
example, in 2012, Congress introduced legislation to disconnect Iranian
banks from the Belgium-based SWIFT—the financial messaging company
that was used near universally for global payments.105 Seeking to present a
united front with the United States, the EU passed a similar regulation shortly
thereafter.106
It was significant that the EU joined the Obama administration in applying
strong sanctions, including cutting off Iran from SWIFT, as it showed
solidarity in coercing Iran into negotiations foreshadowing the landmark
nuclear deal (the JCPOA). However, Europe also set a dangerous precedent
for the United States by allowing American secondary sanctions to cut off
business from a European business entity directly.107 American lawmakers
have followed this precedent by further sanctioning Iranian financial
institutions—with the potential that the United States would follow the same
path in targeting Venezuela or Russia in the future.108 Despite protestation
from some of its member states (e.g., Belgium), the EU fell into line with
U.S. policy—essentially ratifying American use of secondary sanctions
against a European banking system that has never before ousted a nation from
its network.109
b. European Overcompliance
Part of the effectiveness of U.S. secondary sanctions stems from the highly
discretionary power of OFAC, which through its legislative delegation and
executive mandates, can dedicate vast resources to sanctions designations,
implementation, and enforcement.110 According to one former senior U.S.
Treasury official, U.S. district and appeals court rulings imply that the
executive branch has significant discretion in this area.111 No Supreme Court
case has directly addressed the scope of OFAC’s authority, though it is likely
103. Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions
[https://perma.cc/52U4-59TN] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
104. See Rick Gladstone & Nicholas Kulish, West Tightens Iran Sanctions After Embassy
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/world/middleeast/
britain-closure-embassy-iran-expel-diplomats.html [https://perma.cc/H8BD-3P87].
105. See Philip Blenkinsop & Rachelle Younglai, Banking’s SWIFT Says Ready to Block
Iran Transactions, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iransanctions-swift/bankings-swift-says-ready-to-block-iran-transactionsidUSTRE81G26820120217 [https://perma.cc/LCL8-7WMU].
106. Id. (“The United States has been pushing the European Union to force SWIFT to evict
the Iranian firms but it was unclear whether the EU would reach an agreement . . . SWIFT’s
home country, Belgium, does not think the global banking firm should be the only company
of its kind required to comply with sanctions.”).
107. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
108. See id.
109. See Blenkinsop & Younglai, supra note 105.
110. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
111. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
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that the highest court would rule consistently with district courts, which have
tended to show deference to the executive in matters of international
affairs.112
The uncertainty surrounding the operation and procedure behind the
designation, implementation, and enforcement of secondary sanctions has
disproportionately amplified their impact. Such a lack of transparency and
the difficulty of interpreting OFAC’s measures and enforcement have led to
high levels of overcompliance by Europe-based business entities, which find
it preferable to abandon business ties and investments in Iran rather than risk
inadvertently violating any sanctions.113 OFAC’s response to continued
requests from European governments for clarity on these issues has been
slow, inadequate, and, some argue, deliberately oppositional.114
3. Reprisal of the Blocking Regulations
In the wake of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA on
May 8, 2018, the EU has once again faced secondary sanctions affecting
European individuals and business entities.115 The EU has responded with a
reprisal of the EU blocking regulations of the 1990s, which prohibit
European business entities from altering their business operations for the sole
reason of complying with U.S. sanctions.116
Indeed, the revamped and updated EU blocking regulations prohibit any
EU person or entity from complying with secondary sanctions reimposed
after the United States abandoned the JCPOA.117 Although the regulations
provide for a licensing derogation, qualifying for a license requires the
applying party to demonstrate that “serious damage” would result from
noncompliance with the subject U.S. sanction, harming either the party or the
EU.118 Such licensing has proven elusive because licenses are rarely ever
112. See Jonathan Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L.
805, 805–06 (1989); see also infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text.
113. Mengqi Sun, U.S. Sanctions Compliance Fines Hit Decade High, WALL ST. J. (July
25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-compliance-fines-hit-decade-high11564057920 [https://perma.cc/8GXH-X3KG].
114. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26 (“As demonstrated by the Trump
administration’s approach to waivers for continued purchase of Iranian oil, the limited and
temporary exemptions the US may issue to European companies only add to the measures’
aura of unpredictability.”); see also Barnes, supra note 36, at 197–98 (discussing the
differences between European and American jurisprudence on economic sanctions, which
underscores the lack of European understanding of OFAC’s procedures).
115. James McAuley, After Trump Says U.S. Will Withdraw from Iran Deal, Allies Say
They’ll Try to Save It, WASH. POST (May 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/backers-of-iran-nuclear-deal-wage-last-ditch-blitz-seeking-to-sway-trump/2018/05/
08/9b15e3f0-523e-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/4EU3-4EXV].
116. Robin Emmott & Alissa de Carbonnel, In 1990s Redux, EU to Consider Blocking U.S.
Sanctions over Iran, REUTERS (May 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-irannuclear-eu-business/in-1990s-redux-eu-to-consider-blocking-u-s-sanctions-over-iranidUSKBN1IA2PV [https://perma.cc/T6DT-DQ7G].
117. Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 5, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1, 4 (EC).
118. Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/1100 of June 6, 2018, 2018 O.J. (L 199) 1
(EU).
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granted.119 On the other hand, the blocking regulations do provide
protections to EU persons and entities—assuring that any U.S. court
judgment or administrative (i.e., OFAC) determination against an EU person
or entity enforcing targeted U.S. secondary sanctions will not be enforced or
given effect in an EU court.120 Further, the blocking regulations provide the
statutory right for any EU person or entity adversely impacted as a result of
another person or entity complying with the targeted U.S. sanctions to
recover damages from that person or entity.121
This break from the European norm of weak responses to U.S. sanctions
is likely a result of the EU attempting not to lose its diplomatic gravitas,
especially regarding the JCPOA.122 Significantly, however, this strong
response has placed U.S. secondary sanctions and EU blocking regulations
on a crash course, as compliance with both regimes is impossible.
4. Winter Is Coming
The consequence of U.S. secondary sanctions and their outsized influence
is a chilling of the flow of capital, goods, and services.123 These
consequences are only amplified when the U.S. secondary sanctions are
directly at odds with EU blocking regulations.124 The following sections
examine the potential impact of broad secondary sanctions and their conflict
with EU blocking regulations.
a. Impact on Global Commerce
The direct consequence of the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran
(particularly the secondary sanctions) and the EU’s subsequent updating of
the blocking regulations is that both legal regimes are now squarely in
conflict with each other. This situation may be termed a “sanctions war.”
This conflict of laws largely results from posturing by both sides, as the
United States is increasingly relying on secondary sanctions to exert an
outsized influence on the global economy, and the EU is responding in an
attempt to maintain some of its autonomy and diplomatic gravitas.125
Whatever the political reasoning, these conflicting regimes have, of course,
been registered by multinational business entities who may be targeted by the
EU or the United States, acting through OFAC.126
119. See Townsend et al., supra note 43, at 2.
120. Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/1100, supra note 118, at 1.
121. Id.
122. See Guidance Note: Questions and Answers: Adoption of Update of the Blocking
Statute, 2018 O.J. (C 277) 1, 2.
123. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Part I.C.3.
125. See Jacqueline Thomsen, EU Issues Warning to European Companies That Comply
with
New
US
Sanctions
on
Iran,
HILL
(Aug.
7,
2018),
https://thehill.com/policy/international/europe/400704-eu-threatens-to-sanction-europeancompanies-that-comply-with-new [https://perma.cc/G9QA-C9ME].
126. See, e.g., The “New” Iran E.O. and the “New” EU Blocking Sanctions—Navigating
the Divide for International Business, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 9, 2018) [hereinafter The “New”
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These business entities are left with two options.127 First, they may choose
noncompliance with U.S. secondary sanctions, which can lead to punishment
at the hands of OFAC. Second, they may choose to comply with U.S.
sanctions and face the resulting consequences of noncompliance with EU
blocking regulations.
This conflict of laws leaves these multinational entities in a precarious
legal position. Historically, the U.S. sanctions regime has set the standard of
compliance.128 Many multinational business entities have complied with
OFAC’s guidelines and sanctions programs as a matter of course because the
U.S. sanctions regime was often consistent with those of European nations
and access to U.S. markets is of paramount importance.129 Legal advisors
report that there is no obvious solution to this conflict of laws.130
Multinational companies now show a reluctance to engage in deals and
financing where a conflict of sanctions opens potential liability under one
regime or the other.131
As the United States increasingly pursues secondary sanctions, both
unilateral in nature and fraught with ever-increasing fines,132 multinational
businesses face a false choice between halting operations or noncompliance
with one regime of sanctions.
b. Case Study of Executive Order 13,846
On August 6, 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,846 (“EO
13,846”) announcing the reimposition of certain sanctions in relation to
Iran.133 This followed the president’s declaration on May 8, 2018, in which
he announced that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA.134
The announced reimposition of sanctions was largely a reimposition of
secondary sanctions.135

Iran E.O.], https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/new-iran-e-o-andnew-eu-blocking-sanctions-navigating-the-divide-for-international-business.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/M8RV-TNMK]; see also Townsend et al., supra note 43, at 2.
127. See Townsend et al., supra note 43, at 2.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 3.
130. See id.
131. See Bruce Love, Companies Caught in EU–US Sanctions Crossfire, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/97a75318-16a8-11ea-b869-0971bffac109 [https://
perma.cc/4RR7-A5PM]
132. See Sun, supra note 113.
133. Exec. Order No. 13,846, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,939 (Aug. 6, 2018).
134. See President Donald Trump, Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(May 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpjoint-comprehensive-plan-action [https://perma.cc/8776-YX53]; see also National Security
Presidential Memorandum on Ceasing United States Participation in the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action and Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran’s Malign Influence and Deny
Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 311 (May 8, 2018).
135. See The “New” Iran E.O., supra note 126 (explaining that the JCPOA provided for
sanction relief largely only for non-U.S. entities or persons, such that a reimposition of those
sanctions lifted under the plan was almost exclusively reimposing secondary sanctions).
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EO 13,846 provided for three specific types of secondary sanctions that
OFAC was to reimplement with regard to Iran.136 First, the order provides
for blocking sanctions, such as those imposed against entities or persons
placed on the SDN List, allowing OFAC to freeze the assets of these entities
or persons.137 Second, the order provides for correspondent and payablethrough account sanctions, which prohibit or restrict U.S. banks from
opening or maintaining U.S.-based accounts for any foreign business entities
designated by OFAC.138 This amounts to cutting these foreign business
entities or financial institutions off from the American financial system (and
in some cases, ostracizing them from U.S. dollar-based trade, in general).139
Finally, the order provides for a la carte sanctions, authorizing OFAC to
select from a variety of possible sanctions—including visa limitations and
asset-blocking sanctions—to impose against designated entities.140 All three
powers EO 13,846 endows upon OFAC are highly discretionary.
The EU promptly responded with the General Blocking Regulation and
the reimposed Iran Sanctions Blocking Regulation designed to prohibit
compliance by EU entities with the newly reimposed United States
sanctions.141 The “two actions appear to place multinational companies in
an impossible bind between the inconsistent demands (and rhetoric) of
powerful regulators.”142
How OFAC and its European counterparts choose to enforce these
conflicting sanctions regimes remains to be seen. However, the actions have
already had a chilling effect on international commerce.143
II. THE LEGAL CONFLICT: RESPONDING TO SECONDARY SANCTIONS
In light of this legal conflict between the U.S. and European sanctions
regimes, this Note proposes several potential courses of action to mitigate the
freezing effect on international business in a highly globalized world of
commerce. Part II.A examines the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion,
which may be available to a party targeted with secondary sanctions and
explains its futility in the context of secondary sanctions. Part II.B explains
the limited case law challenging OFAC’s authority. Part II.C presents a
picture of judicial timidity in reviewing matters of international sanctions and
discusses the genesis of this deference to OFAC.

136. See id.
137. Exec. Order No. 13,846, § 1, 83 Fed. Reg. at 38,939–40.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 117, at 4–6.
142. The “New” Iran E.O., supra note 126.
143. See Babak Dehghanpisheh & Peter Graff, Trump Says Firms Doing Business in Iran
to Be Barred from U.S. as Sanctions Hit, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/trump-says-firms-doing-business-in-iran-tobe-barred-from-u-s-as-sanctions-hit-idUSKBN1KS13I
[https://perma.cc/7C3P-7RNX]
(reporting that French oil company Total and car manufacturers Renault, PSA, and Daimler
had all suspended investment plans in consideration of the reimposed secondary sanctions).
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A. The Defense of Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Where the EU’s blocking regulations impose directly conflicting
obligations on multinational entities facing liability from both European and
American sanctions, these entities may “plead the defense of foreign
sovereign compulsion to a foreign court in an effort not to comply with its
extra-territorial laws.”144 Under U.S. case law the defense of foreign
sovereign compulsion shields “the acts of parties carried out in obedience to
the mandate of a foreign government” from civil liability.145 To prevail on
a foreign sovereign compulsion defense, “a party must show that: (1) the
behavior violating American law was actually compelled by the foreign
government; and (2) the foreign order was ‘basic and fundamental’ to the
alleged behavior and not just peripheral to the illegal course of conduct.”146
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of foreign sovereign compulsion
in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District
Court,147 where a French blocking statute precluded French citizens from
disclosing evidence to U.S. courts. The Supreme Court held that the U.S.
court was not precluded from ordering a foreign party over whom the court
exercised personal jurisdiction to produce evidence, even if such an order
would cause the foreign party to violate French law.148
The Court reasoned that the French blocking statute was almost
completely irrelevant to its decision affirming the order to produce evidence.
It is clear that American courts are not required to adhere blindly to the
directives of such a [foreign blocking] statute. Indeed, the language of the
statute, if taken literally, would appear to represent an extraordinary
exercise of legislative jurisdiction by the Republic of France over a United
States district judge . . . .149

This prospect of extraterritorial reach by a foreign legislature was deemed
insupportable by the Court.150
Similarly, in another Supreme Court case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California,151 British reinsurers asserted that the American courts lacked
jurisdiction under principles of comity152 as a defense to charges of violating
the Sherman Act.153 The British defendants claimed that applying the
Sherman Act to their conduct would create a significant conflict with U.K.
law.154 Essentially, they pleaded a defense of foreign sovereign compulsion.
The Court refused to give this defense much weight, instead holding that
144. SAMUEL KERN ALEXANDER III, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 251 (1st ed. 2009).
145. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979).
146. United States v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293).
147. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
148. See id. at 544.
149. Id. at 544 n.29.
150. Id. at 544.
151. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
152. Id. at 799.
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
154. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 799.
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there was no true conflict in the laws: “Since the London reinsurers do not
argue that British law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the
law of the United States or claim that their compliance with the laws of both
countries is otherwise impossible, we see no conflict with British law.”155
The mere fact that the subject conduct is lawful in the foreign state will not,
of itself, bar application of the U.S. laws.156
The Supreme Court’s analysis in both Aérospatiale and Hartford Fire
Insurance implies that it would address a foreign sovereign compulsion
defense by a party targeted by secondary sanctions in much the same way.
The Court would likely look to determine whether “there is in fact a true
conflict between domestic and foreign law.”157 In other words, the Court
would look to whether the foreign party’s inconvenience in having to choose
between penalties for violating a foreign blocking statute or penalties for not
complying with U.S. secondary sanctions rises to “a true conflict between
domestic and foreign law.”158 Where U.S. fines administered by OFAC are
increasingly harsh and an SDN listing can cut a company off from the
American market altogether, a court may very well find this defense
viable.159
B. Challenging OFAC
The alternative to the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion would be
an adversely affected party mounting a proactive challenge to an OFAC
determination.160 There is limited case law covering challenges to OFAC
determinations. The jurisprudence addressing the authority of OFAC is
largely limited to cases involving terrorist designation, a process in which
OFAC lists an individual as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(SDGT).161 However, whether an adversely affected party is designated on
the SDN List (a common punishment for secondary sanction violations) or
the SDGT list, the recourse available to that party is largely the same. If a
party is designated on either list and thus has its assets frozen, there are
several means by which it may challenge such a designation.162 First, the
agency’s rules allow for administrative reconsideration.163 Second, if the
155. Id. (citation omitted).
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 403 cmt. e (AM. L.
INST. 1987). Subsection 3 of the Restatement (Third), calling for states to reconsider their laws
out of the principle of comity, “does not apply merely because one state has a strong policy to
permit or encourage an activity which another state prohibits, or one state exempts from
regulation an activity which another regulates.” Id. Subsection 3 applies to exceptional
circumstances. Id.
157. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 798 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. at 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
158. Id.
159. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
160. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 202.
161. See infra Part II.B.2.
162. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 202.
163. See id. at 204.
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adversely affected party is afforded constitutional protections, it may claim
constitutional violations in court.164 If a party does not qualify for
constitutional protections, it may still be able to seek judicial review on other
grounds.165 Either way, judicial review is limited.
1. Administrative Recourse
The mechanisms by which parties can seek administrative reconsideration
from OFAC are outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations.166 These
codified rules issued by OFAC provide limited administrative recourse to
The recourse includes a mechanism for agency
listed parties.167
reconsideration of a party’s designation, in which the designated party may
either submit evidence that shows an insufficient basis for the designation or
propose remedial steps that would negate the designation.168
Importantly, however, the rules promulgated by OFAC require no
transparency regarding what factors were taken into account prior to the
designation or which may be taken into account on administrative
reconsideration.169 Therefore, any evidence submitted by the designated
party is akin to a shot in the dark, hoping the evidence will satisfy OFAC’s
specific concerns.
The D.C. Court of Appeals has described the administrative
reconsideration mechanisms provided by the OFAC regulations as “unlike
the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding,” because “there is no
adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as
evidence, [and] no advance notice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s
internal deliberations.”170 Further, there is no requirement for OFAC to
provide proceedings akin to a trial or oral hearings.171 Under the limited
procedural rights that the OFAC regulations provide, “listed persons are
often in a position in which they are unable to refute rather than simply to
deny the essential allegations made against them.”172

164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See 31 C.F.R. § 501 (2020).
167. See id. §§ 501.806, 501.807(a). The three grounds on which a request for
administrative reconsideration by OFAC may be made are: (1) where a party to blocked
transactions claims that the funds in question have been blocked due to mistaken identity, (2)
where a person believes that a sufficient basis for the designation does not exist, or (3) where
a person proposes to take remedial measures that they believe would negate the basis for the
designation. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 197.
168. See Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationalslist-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list [https://perma.cc/QDP4-ZPGM]
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
169. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 204.
170. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
171. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
172. Barnes, supra note 36, at 206.
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Moreover, it is unclear whether an individual must exhaust the
administrative appeal process before seeking judicial review.173 If a party is
able to claim constitutional violations, however, any possible judicial review
will be more substantive.
2. Violation of Due Process
If a listed party is able to avail itself of constitutional protections, the party
may claim that the procedural inadequacies of the OFAC regulations violate
its right to due process.174 The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of property
without the due process of law.175 A court has held in a due process challenge
that OFAC must provide notice of the nonclassified information
underpinning the designation decision to a petitioner to whom the
Constitution applies and must provide the designated party with an
opportunity to present, in writing, evidence, or arguments to rebut the
allegations made against them.176 However, these requirements are subject
to limitations in special circumstances. For example, the government may
withhold unlimited evidence on which it has relied for designation purposes
if the government determines the material is classified.177
In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. United States Department of
Treasury,178 plaintiff Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (“AHIF–Oregon”)
was a nonprofit organization challenging OFAC’s determination to designate
it an SDGT and the subsequent freezing of its assets (a process akin to SDN
listing) due to allegations that the organization supported terrorists.179 One
of the main claims AHIF–Oregon made on appeal was that its constitutional
right to due process had been violated by OFAC’s confidential designation
process.180 In Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s due
process claim under the Mathews v. Eldridge181 test, which is used for
procedural due process claims.182 Under the Mathews balancing test, the
court must weigh: “(1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest, (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
173. James Killick et al., Challenging Sanctions Designations: Politics and the Judiciary
Collide, in WHITE & CASE LLP, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS: READING THE SIGNALS 12, 15
(2014),
https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/
whitecase_globalinvestigations_readingthesignals.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2CZ-7ESL].
174. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 206–07.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
176. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–09 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
177. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 982 (9th
Cir. 2012).
178. 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012).
179. See id. at 971.
180. Id. at 970.
181. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
182. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979. The Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004), that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a
person’s due process rights is the Mathews balancing test. Id.
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used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government’s
interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional
procedural requirements.”183
Pursuant to the Mathews test, the court recognized the substantial property
interests of AHIF–Oregon, which OFAC’s actions threatened.184 Likewise,
the court acknowledged the high risk of an erroneous deprivation where
OFAC uses confidential information as a basis for an SDGT designation and
asset freezing.185 The court had previously held, with respect to undisclosed
confidential information, that “the very foundation of the adversary process
assumes that use of undisclosed information will violate due process because
of the risk of error.”186
AHIF–Oregon relied on this precedent in its argument that OFAC’s use of
confidential information in its designation was a per se violation of its right
to due process.187 The court disagreed with this interpretation.188 Rather,
the court found that using confidential information is only presumptively
unconstitutional, with that presumption being rebuttable by the government
in “the most extraordinary circumstances.”189 Ultimately, the court found
that the national security interests, provided for in the third factor of the
Mathews balancing test, outweighed the countervailing concerns of the
plaintiff’s right to due process.190
In Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found that the national security interests
offered by OFAC were enough to outweigh the other Mathews factors.
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the executive’s determination that
AHIF–Oregon presented a national security risk.
3. The Nondelegation Doctrine
An alternate argument that an adversely affected party can make is that
OFAC is exercising authority invalidly delegated by Congress to the
executive branch.191 However, case law suggests this argument would likely
fail.192 “U.S. courts have not been receptive to arguments that this
Congressional oversight function is an insufficient control on delegated
executive power and that the [IEEPA] is an unconstitutional delegation of

183. Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S at 334–35).
184. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979–80 (“The private party’s property interest is significant.
By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity.
All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with
the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense.”).
185. See id. at 980.
186. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995).
187. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 982.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 982–83.
191. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 206.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Mirza, 454 F. App’x 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 347 (2011).
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legislative authority to the Executive.”193 Rather, courts find sufficient
IEEPA’s envisaged congressional oversight of the executive through its
reporting requirements.194
C. Limited Judicial Review
If the adversely affected party is unsuccessful in its request for an
administrative reconsideration of its case, the party may pursue judicial
review of OFAC’s agency decision.195
1. A Silent IEEPA
IEEPA does not explicitly provide for judicial review.196 The law does
not provide for or outline a clear standard by which courts should review
OFAC regulations, policy statements, or enforcement, other than those
provided for under the default standards of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).197 The APA does not explicitly furnish a cause of action, so any
party seeking to challenge OFAC’s determination or enforcement would
have to invoke another statute to challenge the action in court.198
Significantly, IEEPA provides no such cause of action.199 Therefore, a party
can only challenge the procedure of the agency’s actions, rather than the
merits of its decision.200
It has been argued that the omission of explicit judicial review provisions
acts as a signpost to courts that the legislature did not contemplate extensive
judicial review.201 As such, courts may view the omission as further
evidence that conducting a review of the merits of OFAC decisions is outside
of their duty.202
2. What Is the Standard of Review?
Because IEEPA does not provide for judicial review independently, any
action OFAC takes pursuant to IEEPA is reviewed according to the APA.203
Thus, courts review an OFAC designation or inclusion on the SDN List by
examining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of

193. Barnes, supra note 36, at 201.
194. See supra Part I.B.
195. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
196. See 50 U.S.C. § 1706.
197. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
198. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977).
199. See 50 U.S.C. § 4305.
200. See Louisa C. Slocum, Comment, OFAC, The Department of State, and the Terrorist
Designation Process: A Comparative Analysis of Agency Discretion, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 387,
406 (2013).
201. See id.
202. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
203. See Slocum, supra note 200, at 406.
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discretion, or in violation of statutory authority.204 Moreover, any judicial
review under this standard is circumscribed to a review of the administrative
record.205 Indeed, the APA does not require agencies to hold a hearing or to
make formal findings of fact when rendering any decisions.206 As such,
unless some other applicable law would require it, courts must limit their
review of OFAC actions to OFAC’s administrative record and any
contemporaneous addenda made by the agency.207
The D.C. Court of Appeals commented on this weak standard of review in
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Department of
State208: “We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material
before the Secretary is or is not true. As we wrote earlier, the [administrative]
record consists entirely of hearsay, none of it was ever subjected to adversary
testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the
organizations affected.”209 Despite this recognition of the possible
inadequacies of the administrative record, the court adhered to its limited
function of review and deferred to the agency’s determination in that case.210
Similarly, the courts have been loath to substitute their judgment for the
government’s judgment as to what material should remain confidential in
sanctions proceedings.211 The courts have accepted the argument that they
are not best placed to determine which items of information should remain
classified and which could be disclosed without risking national security.212
In any review of agency action under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
standard, courts need not find that the agency’s decision is “the only
reasonable one, or even that it is the result [the court] would have reached

204. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C). While the APA-outlined standards call for deference
to all agencies in administrative law, agencies engaged in decisions about foreign affairs and
national security receive an extremely deferential standard of review. See Humanitarian L.
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that where a “regulation
involves the conduct of foreign affairs, we owe the executive branch even more latitude than
in the domestic context”); see also KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v.
Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 915 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“Although arbitrary and capricious
review is highly deferential to agencies, the government asserts an even higher degree of
deference in the realm of foreign affairs.”).
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2).
206. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140–41 (1973).
207. See Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 638 F.3d 794 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The
additional allowance permitting OFAC to amend the administrative record with an ex post
justification for a listing essentially “allows the Executive to move the goalposts in response
to a listed person’s representations rather than presenting a clear case for the listed person to
answer.” Barnes, supra note 36, at 209.
208. 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id. (“[The Secretary’s] conclusion might be mistaken, but that depends on the quality
of the information in the reports she received—something we have no way of judging.”).
211. See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzalez, 477 F.3d 728, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
see also Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–209 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
212. See cases cited supra note 211.
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had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.”213 The
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the
presumably more expert agency.214 In particular, courts reviewing OFAC
determinations recognize a standard of high deference because OFAC acts
“in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and
administrative law.”215
This deference to OFAC is consistent with a grander judicial tradition of
truncating consideration of matters that implicate foreign affairs.216 This
judicial deference has been likened to a siren song to which federal judges
are drawn when asked to rule on delicate or controversial matters.217
However, this automatic deference may not always be justified.218
Moreover, at least one scholar has argued that courts’ abdication of their
responsibility to hear cases simply because the matter touches on foreign
affairs is inconsistent with the Constitution.219
III. MOVING TOWARD A BETTER SYSTEM
While the current system does not provide many options for recourse to
individuals or companies caught in the crosshairs of conflicting secondary
sanctions regimes, several solutions are possible that may change the current
system for the better. Each of the possible solutions should not be viewed in
isolation. A combination of efforts on the following fronts will be most
successful in mitigating the confusion surrounding secondary sanctions.
A. Recommendations
The following recommendations are intended to improve the system of
secondary sanctions. Through these recommendations for heightened
213. Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 422 (1983)
(quoting Unemployment Comp. Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)).
214. See Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 638 F.3d 794 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
215. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 734; see also Emergency Coal. to Defend
Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 F. Supp. 2d 150, 166 n.10 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding
that “the regulations at issue here are entitled to an even greater measure of deference [than
Chevron deference] because they relate to the exercise of the Executive’s authority in the
realm of foreign affairs”).
216. MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 254 (2019). If a reprisal of the judiciary’s role is to
occur, Professor Martin Flaherty outlines several regards in which the federal judiciary must
recommit:
Such a recommitment first of all will mean hearing cases even though, or perhaps
better, precisely because, they implicate foreign affairs. It will further require, once
a case is taken up, “saying what the law is” without deferring to other parts of the
government simply because the matter deals with foreign affairs.
Id.
217. Id. at 177.
218. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Yet it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).
219. FLAHERTY, supra note 216, at 46 (observing that contrary to modern
misunderstandings, the principle of separation of powers would apply to foreign affairs “as
fully, if not more fully” than to domestic matters).
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judicial review and increased agency transparency, individuals and business
entities will have greater confidence in their operations around the world.
1. Heightened Judicial Review
While OFAC’s actions may being challenged under an arbitrary and
capricious review of the agency’s determinations, such challenges have been
largely unsuccessful.220 Similarly, the agency’s lack of transparency in the
sanctioning process may be alleged to violate either the constitutional
protection of due process or the principle of nondelegation.221 However,
these challenges have also been largely unsuccessful.222
First, because IEEPA does not provide for judicial review,223 any
challenge to OFAC’s agency actions is reviewed pursuant to the APA.224
However, because the APA does not explicitly furnish a cause of action,225
and IEEPA does not provide one,226 the party seeking review can only
challenge the procedure of the agency’s actions, rather than the merits of its
decision.227
While the APA acts as a fail-safe measure to ensure judicial review of
agency actions where relevant statutes may not explicitly provide for such
review, it is a weak fail-safe. Due to the minimal requirements within the
APA for the agency record, any judicial review of an OFAC determination
is based on a record that may be wholly unsatisfactory, lacking information
to enable the adversely affected party to make arguments and present
evidence.228
Moreover, IEEPA’s omission of an explicit provision for judicial review
signals to courts that the legislature may not have contemplated extensive
judicial review because Congress would normally have provided for such in
the relevant statute.229 Accordingly, courts may believe it is outside of their
province to conduct reviews of the merits of OFAC decisions.230
Further, the lack of success in challenging OFAC’s actions is partially due
to the amount of deference afforded to the agency by the courts simply by
virtue of OFAC operating in foreign affairs.231 This high level of deference
complicates and largely nullifies any legal challenges to OFAC’s actions.232

220. See supra Part II.C.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
223. See 50 U.S.C. § 1706.
224. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
225. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977).
226. 50 U.S.C. § 4305.
227. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
231. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
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The executive branch’s assumption of the hegemonic role in American
foreign relations should trigger the constitutional check of the other
branches.233 Specifically, the federal judiciary can and should play a key role
in balancing the power of the executive. The federal judiciary should halt its
current trend of refusing to duly consider cases that implicate foreign
affairs.234 Rather than automatic deference to the executive agency operating
in foreign affairs, the federal judiciary should recognize the unique risk posed
for adversely affected parties by an executive agency with unfettered
discretion.235 It is incumbent upon the federal judiciary to reprise its role as
a check on the executive branch’s power in foreign affairs.236
To assist the federal judiciary in bucking its current trend of deference to
agencies involved in foreign affairs, Congress could further amend
IEEPA.237 In its current state, there is no explicit provision for judicial
review and thus the default arbitrary and capricious review provided for in
the APA applies.238 An amendment to IEEPA should provide explicitly for
a searching judicial review of executive actions taken pursuant to the statute.
With such an amendment, Congress would telegraph to the judiciary that
OFAC’s actions may warrant a more searching review, notwithstanding
OFAC’s role in foreign affairs.
2. Clearer Administrative Guidance and Heightened Transparency
In their current state, OFAC’s procedures lack sufficient transparency,
even under the APA, to allow for sufficient judicial review and appeal by
materially harmed parties.239
Because OFAC has little incentive to self-adjust, as it continues operating
unchecked by the courts, Congress may again assist in moving toward more
transparency. In its current state, IEEPA allows the president a significant
amount of discretion in economic sanctions.240 The president subsequently
has delegated much of this power to OFAC.241 A heightened standard of
transparency could be exacted from OFAC if Congress were to recognize the
delegation and explicitly provide for more transparent rulemaking
procedures, including appeals processes for those targeted with secondary
sanctions.
3. Alternative Solutions Under International Law
A possible alternative to domestic self-correction in the U.S. sanctions
regime is one that utilizes the international institutions and treaties that the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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United States was so critical in establishing. International treaties on trade
and commerce may provide a viable path to avoiding a sanctions war. For
example, Europe’s complaint to the WTO and WTO-facilitated negotiations
with the Clinton administration were successful in nullifying heavy-handed
secondary sanctions.242
This multilateral approach is viable, but the alternative argument is that
the United States is not actually engaging in reprehensible extraterritorial
sanctioning but rather, simply benefiting from the indirect effect of
businesses adhering to American foreign policy. Indeed, some argue that
using economic sanctions is well within the sovereign authority of a nation
and any indirect impact on international commerce is still preferable to the
coercive use of force.243
B. Weighing the Recommendations: What Is Most Viable?
While international pressure and diplomacy have proven effective
before,244 this Note argues that this is the least viable solution under the
current circumstances. The United States is enjoying unprecedented
domination of the global financial system and maintains its dominance in its
rate of consumption of goods and services.245 This highly leveraged position
allows the United States to confidently enact secondary sanctions that
adversely impact its allies, without fear of damaging diplomatic
retribution.246 It is unlikely the EU would successfully turn back the trend
of increasingly common secondary sanctions while its businesses remain so
heavily dependent on access to the U.S. markets.247
It is more likely that a combination of judicial, administrative, and
legislative reform would be the most potent in improving the system of
secondary sanctions. Mitigating the chilling effect that secondary sanctions
and their conflict with European blocking regulations have had248 and
threaten to have will involve proactive steps from within all three branches
of the U.S. government. An explicit mandate for heightened judicial review
of actions undertaken pursuant to IEEPA will require congressional
amendment of the law. The judicial branch must follow suit and alter its
tradition of automatic deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs.
Finally, the executive branch itself can alter its current procedures from
within, increasing the transparency of OFAC’s determinations and
enforcement of secondary sanctions.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26.
See Kaempfer & Lowenberg, supra note 101.
See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the system surrounding secondary sanctions should be
reformed. The system’s lack of clarity and lack of sufficient judicial review
is arguably unconstitutional. Moreover, parties with global operations face
both uncertainty and potentially severe liability under the current state of the
law. Recognizing that an increasing proportion of modern transactions
involve myriad parties from many different countries, including those who
may be affiliated with sanctioned nations, the United States should reform its
current system to mitigate the confusion and risk associated with these
transactions. The issue intensifies when this opaque system finds itself in
direct conflict with European blocking regulations. This legal conflict with
some of the United States’s closest allies and trading partners should further
motivate reform from within. Reform via heightened judicial review and
clearer administrative procedures will encourage the flow of capital and
goods and services, as well as improve relations with Europe.

